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Abstract
This paper develops a gravity model with sector-level input-output linkages in production. In
contrast to a traditional gravity approach, which relies on direct gross exports between bilateral
trade partners, our model additionally includes (1) domestic and global value chain linkages between
goods and services sectors, (2) bilateral tariffs that affect direct production for a final destination as
well as indirect production (shipped via third countries) to a final destination and (3) value added
rather than gross production. Including input-output linkages implies that domestic production of
intermediates can serve as inputs in foreign products and subsequently be exported “indirectly”
to a final destination. Our input-output model can be taken to the sectoral World Input Output
Database (WIOD) and can be used to evaluate trade policy shocks. While our framework is entirely
general, we use it to predict the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (“Brexit”)
in terms of value added production and employment for every individual EU country involved. We
find that Brexit hits the UK relatively harder than the EU-27. In contrast to other studies, we find
EU-27 losses from Brexit to be substantially higher than hitherto believed.
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1. Introduction
Production processes are increasingly fragmented across national boundaries. The emergence of
global production networks imply that one can no longer consider bilateral trade in isolation when
evaluating trade policy or idiosyncratic shocks (Johnson, 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2012). A full
assessment of trade shocks requires new models that consider global value chain linkages and trade
costs worldwide. The starting point of this paper is that a country’s production can be exported
either directly or indirectly to a final destination. Indirect exports are intermediates that are used
in the production process of other countries before they are shipped to the final destination. A
traditional gravity model would not take these international production linkages into account and
typically only consider the direct shipments between bilateral trade partners2. In this paper, we
develop and explicitly solve a model that allows us to separately identify all the channels through
which tariff changes operate. This results in a gravity model that overcomes the limitations of a
traditional gravity approach and that derives closed-form solutions which allow for comparative
statics on tariff changes. We then use the model to simulate the impact of the UK’s withdrawal
from the EU (“Brexit”). Our approach complements existing papers on Brexit that have used either
standard gravity or simulated general equilibrium models to estimate the effects of Brexit3.
The model that we develop is probably closest to the one by Noguera (2012) which features indirect
exports in a value added setting. Whereas Noguera (2012) considers aggregate trade flows at
the country-level, however, we develop a model with both final and intermediate trade flows at
the more disaggregate sector-level. This has a number of important advantages. First, trade tariffs
vary substantially across sectors, which means that a failure to account for this heterogeneity across
sectors may lead to biased results. Second, as intra-industry trade between countries is substantial,
it is important to allow two distinct countries to be active in the same sector producing similar
goods. Third, our model allows for differences in the trade elasticity across sectors, meaning that
consumers (and firms) can react differently to price changes in different sectors. Fourth, it exploits
2Take the example of Brexit, where a traditional gravity approach would only consider the direct impact of a
UK tariff on Belgian shipments. However, Brexit also entails a UK tariff on German goods, which indirectly will
also affect Belgian production whenever Belgian inputs are embedded in German exports to the UK. This paper
considers the impact of tariff changes on both direct and indirect shipments via third countries.
3See, for instance, Dhingra et al. (2017) who simulate a computable general equilibrium model with inter-sectoral
linkages to which they feed trade flows, trade elasticities and Leontief input-output coefficients. Their focus is solely
on UK welfare and income effects which differs from ours. Other papers on Brexit that do not take global intersectoral
production linkages into account are Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), Booth et al. (2015) and Lawless and Morgenroth
(2016).
2
the availability of sector-level data such as the World Input-Ouput Database (WIOD), which allows
us to include services in the analysis. This is important given that services are increasingly traded as
well as embedded in the exports of goods. Disregarding services would therefore miss an important
share of global trade. Finally, as the production linkages between two countries typically differ
greatly across sectors, our sectoral approach will yield a more precise assessment of the indirect
effects of a trade shock. Empirically, we find these indirect effects to be quite substantial and
equally important as the direct effects.
The theoretical framework developed in this paper features a Cobb-Douglas-CES nest in production
as well as in consumption. On the production side, firms produce output with a Cobb-Douglas
technology and fixed expenditure shares on labor and a composite intermediate good, taking goods
and factor prices as given. The composite intermediate good is a Cobb-Douglas combination of
intermediate goods from all sectors. Each of these sector-specific intermediate goods is a Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregate across all the countries the input can be purchased from.
On the consumption side, final consumers derive utility from an aggregate final good, which is a
Cobb-Douglas combination of final goods from different sectors. Every sector-specific final good
is a CES aggregate across all countries the good can be purchased from. The CES nests on the
production and the consumption side rely on the Armington assumption, which means that goods
produced by different sources are imperfect substitutes simply because of their origin. The way
producers and consumers substitute between goods from different countries within a given sector
is directly related to the sector’s trade elasticity. The Armington assumption closely mimics the
input-output data that shows that in reality similar inputs (from the same sector) are purchased
from different countries.
This is different from a Ricardian approach where every input is sourced from only one particular
country, as in Dhingra et al. (2015) and Caliendo et al. (2015). How much is sourced from each
country depends on relative prices, which is a function of the productive efficiency of the supplier
and trade costs. Finally, in our analysis we focus on the value-added share in a country-sector’s
production and the employment associated with it.
Our theoretical framework predicts that an increase in import tariffs will result in production and
job losses losses all along the supply chain. The losses in value added production depend on three
parameters, namely the sectoral trade elasticity, the value added shares in production and the
Leontief input-output coefficients. The employment losses are obtained from the production losses
by means of an employment elasticity. The theory predicts that some of these losses can be mitigated
by “trade diversion”, resulting from the changes in the multilateral resistance terms. Trade diversion
3
arises, for instance, when a UK tariff on German imports results in Germany redirecting some of
its exports to alternative destinations, and the UK importing from other sources that have become
relatively cheaper. However, redirecting trade flows typically takes time. In our predictions on
the impact of Brexit, we focus on the short-term effects since we cannot empirically observe the
change in multilateral resistance terms. While this is a limitation, there are a number of studies
such as Magee (2008) that suggest that the trade diversion effects are typically low, compared to
the first-order trade effects, which is what we focus on here4. Our short-term approach also implies
that we do not consider foreign direct investment (FDI) responses to trade policy, which may take
longer to materialize. Moreover, we disregard any dynamic effects of Brexit related to investment
and innovation, capital mobility and migration.
The database that we use is the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)5, as in Johnson and
Noguera (2012), Foster-McGregor and Stehrer (2013), Timmer et al. (2014), Timmer et al. (2015)
and others that have investigated inter-sector and international linkages in global value chains albeit
to address different questions. Our approach also differs from David et al. (2013), who assess US
employment effects of Chinese import penetration at the regional level but do not consider the
input-output linkages between industries. The novelty of our approach is that we consider all the
downstream employment effects that stem from a change in domestic value added following a trade
shock.
Another line of work in recent years has gone into identifying the welfare gains and losses from
trade policy but has been less about inter-sectoral linkages and intermediates (see Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare, 2013 for an overview). An increasing number of papers in trade also turn to
input-output data in the context of trade policy but with a different focus, e.g. Blanchard et al.
(2016) who show that countries which are more connected in global value chains have lower tariff
protection between them, Dhingra et al. (2017) who evaluate Brexit on UK household income levels
and Caliendo et al. (2015) who assess the welfare effects of NAFTA. Finally, several studies in trade
have now shown that gross trade flows do not necessarily reflect the domestic production underlying
4In his basic gravity model, Magee (2008) finds that bilateral trade flows are estimated to increase by 82% after
countries engage in a regional agreement and this effect is significant across different econometric specifications. On
the contrary, the variable capturing trade diversion reduces imports from outside by 2.9% but is not significant across
different econometric specifications, suggesting that trade diversion is small compared to the direct trade effects.
5We use the release 2016 of the World-Input-Output Database (WIOD). This sector-level database provides
information about the origin and destination of intermediate and final goods and services in 56 sectors using ISIC
Rev.4 for 43 countries, and a residual rest of the world between the years 2000 and 2014. Dietzenbacher et al. (2013)
describes in great detail the procedure that was followed to construct these World Input-Output Tables.
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the trade flow (Koopman et al., 2014; Bernard et al., 2017)6.
A limitation of the WIOD sector-level data is the lack of information on the underlying firm
distribution. Using this database, we cannot know which firms import intermediaries and which
firms are the exporting ones. However, whereas firm-level studies with information on their trading
activity are often limited in their geographic scope and typically only include firms from one
country7, WIOD has a worldwide coverage that allows for the study of production networks covering
all countries. Another advantage of using WIOD is that all upstream and downstream sectors can
be identified for any sector in the production network, allowing for the construction of input-output
linkages.
WIOD provides us with observations on the main variables required for our analysis of the impact
of a trade shock like Brexit, i.e. trade flows, value added shares and production input-output
linkages. We complement this data with estimates of sector-level trade elasticities and employment
elasticities that we obtain from the literature. We consider both a “soft” Brexit (the “Norwegian
scenario”), where the UK continues to be part of the Single Market but faces increased Non-Tariff
Barriers (NTBs), as well as a “hard” Brexit scenario where Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariffs
between the EU-27 and the UK are put in place in addition to the NTBs.
Our model predictions indicate that the UK is hit relatively harder than the rest of the EU-27 in
both scenarios. In either case, Brexit reduces economic activity in the UK around three times more
than in the EU-27. The UK will experience a drop in value added production as a percentage of
GDP of 1.21% under a soft Brexit and up to 4.47% under a hard Brexit scenario. This corresponds
to UK job losses of 139,860 jobs in the “soft” Brexit and 526,830 jobs in the “hard” Brexit scenario.
For the EU-27, the absolute job losses are larger, with the numbers of EU-27 jobs lost from Brexit
varying between 284,440 jobs and 1,209,470 jobs respectively which corresponds to value added
losses as a percentage of GDP of 0.38% for the “soft” and 1.54% for the “hard” Brexit. The losses
in value added and jobs differ substantially across EU-27 member states. EU-27 member states
that stand to lose most from Brexit are countries with close historical ties to the UK (e.g. Ireland,
Malta) and small open economies on the European continent (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands).
The Brexit impact varies across countries due to differences in sectoral composition. As shown by
Acemoglu et al. (2012), it is the network centrality of sectors that determines the impact of an
6Bernard et al. (2017) empirically show that many products shipped by manufacturing firms are not produced
in-house, but are “carry-along trade”, i.e. gross export sales are much larger than the domestic production shipped.
7Viegelahn and Vandenbussche (2014) use micro-level data for India and have information on firm-level importing
and exporting activities of Indian firms, but do not know the firms they are buying from or are selling to.
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aggregate shock through a “cascade effect” in the input-output network. Under Brexit, we consider
different tariffs across sectors, and therefore the propagation of tariff shocks differs depending on
the sectoral composition of the economy. A sector that only has a few linkages with other sectors
may not affect aggregate output much even when it is subject to high tariffs, as opposed to a sector
that is very central in the production network. Our results take the network centrality and the
number of sectoral production linkages into account when estimating the loss in value added and
jobs caused by Brexit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theoretical model
and obtain an expression for a country-sector’s value added production and its determinants on the
basis of which we obtain clear predictions on the effects of trade shocks. In Section 3, we explain the
methodology and describe the data we use. Section 4 presents the results of the Brexit application.
Section 5 compares our results to existing results in the literature and Section 6 concludes.
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2. An Input-Output Model of Trade
In the model below we use superscripts to denote the country-sector of origin and subscripts to
denote the country-sector of destination. To facilitate understanding, let us consider the following
example. The quantity of intermediate steel from Belgium shipped to the German car industry
is denoted by XBE,steelDE,car . In general, countries are denoted by i, j and k and sectors by r, s
and z8. Demand for labor by country k’s sector z for example is captured by Lkz. Throughout
this section, upper-case symbols refer to real quantities, whereas lower-case symbols denote their
nominal counterparts.
The model is based on the Armington assumption, which means that goods produced by different
sources are imperfect substitutes simply because of their origin. As a result, within a sector, goods
from different countries can coexist in the same destination market, even though their prices may
differ as they are determined by the country-sector’s marginal production cost and costs of trade
with the destination country9. Consumers (and firms) have a love-for-variety and prefer to consume
positive amounts of each available variety.
2.1. Consumer Demand
The representative consumer in country k derives utility from consuming quantities of an aggregate
final good Fk:
Uk = Fk =
S∏
s=1
[
F sk
]αsk
(1)
which is a Cobb-Douglas combination of quantities F sk consumed of final goods from all sectors
s ∈ S, with αsk the corresponding share in total expenditures. This sector-specific final good is a
CES aggregate across all countries the good can be purchased from,
F sk =
[
N∑
i=1
(
F isk
)σs−1
σs
] σs
σs−1
(2)
8We need at least three symbols in the model to denote countries and sectors because input-output models
typically consider three nodes in a supply chain: (1) the supplier of intermediate inputs, (2) the final producer and
(3) the consumer.
9As in Noguera (2012), production and trade costs are the only determinants of prices in our model. This does
not imply that firms cannot charge markups. In WIOD, however, we have no information on the underlying firm-level
distribution within each sector. The absence of markups in the model is assumed at sectoral level.
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where σs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution (for final goods) between the countries of origin within
sector s10.
2.2. Producers
In country k’s sector z, output Y kz is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology combining
labor Lkz and intermediate inputs Xkz
11:
Y kz = (Lkz)
1−βkz (Xkz)β
kz
(3)
where βkz represents the share of intermediate expenditures in total sales of country k’s sector z.
The intermediate goods composite Xkz is a Cobb-Douglas combination of intermediate goods from
all sectors s ∈ S, Xskz:
Xkz =
S∏
s=1
[
Xskz
]γskz
(4)
where Xskz denotes the real aggregate demand of intermediates from sector s by country k’s sector z,
and γskz is the corresponding share in total expenditures on inputs. The sector-specific intermediate
good Xskz is a CES aggregate across all countries the input can be purchased from:
Xskz =
[
N∑
i=1
(
Xiskz
) ρs−1
ρs
] ρs
ρs−1
(5)
where ρs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution (for intermediate goods) between the countries of
origin within sector s12. Note that this nested Cobb-Douglas-CES structure is similar to that of
the consumer demand aggregates.
2.3. Utility and Profit Maximization
Let wkz denote the price of labor in country k’s sector z (Lkz) and p
kz the price of output from kz
(Y kz). Given iceberg-type trade barriers, in order to satisfy country j’s demand of one unit of kz,
kz needs to produce τkzj units, with τ
kz
j > 1. The price of one unit of kz’s output in destination j
10For simplicity, we assume this sector-specific elasticity of substitution to be the same across all countries k.
11Following several standard trade models, we allow only for one factor of production. This assumption can be
relaxed, for instance by accounting for high-and low skilled labor.
12For simplicity, we assume this sector-specific elasticity of substitution to be the same across all countries k.
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then equals pkzj = τ
kz
j p
kz accounting for differences in trade costs across destinations j. Note that
we typically assume there are no barriers to trade within a country, i.e. τkzk = 1.
Firms maximize profits by choosing Lkz and X
is
kz and households maximize utility choosing F
is
k
subject to their budget which equals Ik =
∑S
z=1 wkzLkz, i.e. their income from supplying labor Lkz
to each sector z in country k. Firms and households take factor price wkz and goods prices τ
kz
j p
kz
as given. This results in the optimal nominal counterparts of real demand (which are denoted by a
lower-case symbol and that are obtained by multiplying real demand by the corresponding price).
Nominal output of kz is represented by ykz ≡ pkzY kz. The CES price index in country k of final
goods from sector s equals P sk =
[∑N
i=1
(
pisk
)1−σs] 11−σs
. The price of the aggregate intermediate
input Xkz is given by the Cobb-Douglas price index PIkz =
∏S
s=1(P
s
k )
γskz where P sk is the CES
price index in country k for intermediate goods from sector s which we assume, for tractability, to
be the same as the corresponding price index for final goods (this implies that σs = ρs and that
the price of a certain good from sector s is the same whether it is sold as an intermediate or a final
good13. The (FOB) price14 of output from kz equals pkz = ( wkz
1−βkz )
1−βkz (PIkz
βkz
)β
kz
. The optimal
nominal demands then equal:
lkz ≡ wkzLkz = (1− βkz)ykz
xkz ≡ PIkzXkz = βkzykz
xskz ≡ P skXskz = γskzβkzykz
xiskz ≡ pisk Xiskz = τ isk pisXiskz = (
τ isk p
is
P sk
)1−σsγskzβ
kzykz (6)
f isk ≡ pisk F isk = τ isk pisF isk = (
τ isk p
is
P sk
)1−σsαsk
S∑
z=1
(1− βkz)ykz (7)
13The assumption that firms and consumers share the same price elasticities allows us to substantially simplify
the analysis, as in Noguera (2012).
14The assumption of perfect pass-through inherent to this theoretical framework is a limiting assumption since
pass-through depends on firm size with larger firms having lower pass-through rates (Amiti et al. (2014)). However,
in the WIOD data we have no information on the underlying firm size distribution within a sector.
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2.4. Market Clearing
Let ekzj ≡ fkzj +
∑S
s=1 x
kz
js denote the nominal gross exports from country-sector kz to (the consumer
and producers in) country j. Market clearing requires
ykz =
N∑
j=1
ekzj (8)
Following the same logic as in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), we derive gravity equations for
final and intermediate goods exports, but now at the sector-level. Denote world nominal output by
yw and country-sector kz’s share in world output by θkz ≡ ykz/yw. Substituting Equations (6) and
(7) into Equation (8) allows to solve for prices pis. Substituting these into the price index P sk and
plugging the resulting expression for P sk into (6) and (7) results in the following gravity equations
for intermediate and final bilateral exports and equilibrium price indices:
xkzjs =
ykzγzjsβ
jsyjs
yw
(
τkzj
ΠkzP zj
)1−σz (9)
fkzj =
ykzαzj
∑S
s=1(1− βjs)yjs
yw
(
τkzj
ΠkzP zj
)1−σz (10)
P zj =
[
N∑
k=1
θkz(
τkzj
Πkz
)1−σz
] 1
1−σz
Πkz =
 N∑
j=1
φzj (
τkzj
P zj
)1−σz
 11−σz
where φzj =
∑S
s=1 θ
js(γzjsβ
js + αzj (1− βjs)) is a measure of the importance of goods from sector z
for producers and consumers in country j. It takes into account (i) the dependence of producers in
all sectors s in country j on intermediates from sector z through θjsγzjsβ
js and (ii) the importance
of goods from sector z in the final demand by households in country j (through αzj ) and the total
income these households earn in all sectors s in j (through θjs(1− βjs)).
Equation (9) relates bilateral intermediate trade between firms in country-sector kz and country-
sector js to (i) the economic masses of source and destination relative to the world, (ii) the
importance of inputs in the destination’s production (βjs) and the importance of sector z goods
within these inputs (γzjs), (iii) the bilateral trade costs between countries k and j in sector z (τ
kz
j ),
and (iv) outward and inward multilateral resistance terms (Πkz and P zj ). Similarly, Equation (10)
relates bilateral final goods trade between firms in country-sector kz and the consumers in country
10
j to (i) the economic masses of source (ykz) and destination (
∑S
s=1(1 − βjs)yjs)15 relative to the
economic mass of the world (yw), (ii) the importance of sector z final goods in the destination’s
consumption (αzj ), (iii) the bilateral trade costs between countries k and j in sector z (τ
kz
j ), and
(iv) outward and inward multilateral resistance terms (Πkz and P zj ).
2.5. Input-Output Production Linkages
Dividing both sides of Equation (9) by yjs we obtain the technical coefficient akzjs or ”dollar’s worth
of inputs from kz per dollar’s worth of output of js”:
xkzjs
yjs
≡ akzjs =
ykzγzjsβ
js
yw
(
τkzj
ΠkzP zj
)1−σz (11)
Plugging the technical coefficients into the market clearing in condition in (8), we have
ykz =
N∑
j=1
(
S∑
s=1
xkzjs + f
kz
j )
=
N∑
j=1
S∑
s=1
akzjs y
js +
N∑
j=1
fkzj
which can be summarized for all countries and sectors as
Y = AY +
N∑
j=1
fj (12)
where
Y =

y1,1
y1,2
...
yN,S
 ; A =

a1,11,1 a
1,1
1,2 a
1,1
1,3 . . . a
1,1
N,S
a1,21,1 a
1,2
1,2 a
1,2
1,3 . . . a
1,2
N,S
...
...
...
. . .
...
aN,S1,1 a
N,S
1,2 a
N,S
1,3 . . . a
N,S
N,S
 ; fj =

f1,1j
f1,2j
...
fN,Sj

where fj is the (S ∗N) x 1 vector of country j’s final demands and A the (S∗N) x (S∗N) global
bilateral input-output matrix at the sectoral level. The system in Equation (12) can be written as
(I−A)Y =
N∑
j=1
fj (13)
15This expression reflects the fact that consumers in country j get their income from supplying labor to all sectors
s.
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with I the (S∗N) x (S∗N) identity matrix. If (I−A) can be inverted, we can find the solution for
nominal output as
Y = (I−A)−1
N∑
j=1
fj = L
N∑
j=1
fj (14)
where L is known as the Leontief inverse matrix. Each element Lkzis of L is the Leontief coefficient
that measures the total of dollars worth of country-sector kz goods required to meet 1 dollar worth
of is’ final demand. This value combines kz goods used as inputs in is directly as well as kz goods
used as inputs in other industries which then also produce inputs for is. Using this, we can obtain
country k’s nominal output in sector z as
ykz =
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lkzis
N∑
j=1
f isj (15)
=
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lkzis
N∑
j=1
(
yisαsj
∑S
r=1(1− βjr)yjr
yw
(
τ isj
ΠisP sj
)1−σs
)
where we substituted the gravity relation from Equation (10) for the final value f isj flowing from
country-sector is to the consumer in country j. Finally, we can transform this into value added
production. For this purpose, we assume that the value added share of a country-sector’s production
is the part that is generated by its labor. Looking back at the production function in (3), the value
created by country-sector kz after accounting for the intermediates used is captured by the share of
labor 1− βkz. Hence, following Noguera (2012) we find the value added embodied in kz’s nominal
production ykz as (1− βkz)ykz where 1− βkz ≡ vkz is the value added to output ratio. The total
value added production by kz can thus be written as
vakz = vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lkzis
N∑
j=1
f isj (16)
This value added production (and the jobs depending on it) might be severely impacted in the case
of a trade shock, which is the subject of the next section.
2.6. Evaluating Trade Shocks
In this section, we examine the impact of a trade shock such as Brexit on a country-sector’s value
added production. Equation (16) shows that an import tariff imposed on a specific good will not
only affect the producer of the good, but also the suppliers of goods and services whose output is
used as an input in the production of the good. This implies that when the UK imposes a tariff on
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German cars, the Belgian steel sector which supplies inputs to the German car industry will also
be affected, even in the absence of a UK import tariff on Belgian steel. This channel is missing in
a traditional gravity approach but can be captured by our model. The impact of a trade shock can
be examined by considering what would happen when the variable trade costs (τ) change16. Our
interest lies in the change dvakz in country-sector kz’s value added production, which we find to
equal17
dvakz = −vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj
{
f isj +
S∑
r=1
xisjr
}
= −vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj e
is
j (17)
from which we can derive the following general result. Rising trade costs reduce bilateral trade
flows eisj between any country-sector is and j. As kz has an interest L
kz
is in each of these bilateral
flows, vakz will decrease as well. The drop depends on the magnitude of the change in relative
trade costs τˆ isj between is and j and the corresponding trade elasticity σs.
In Equation (17), we defined τˆ isj ≡
dτ isj
τ isj
− dΠisΠis −
dP sj
P sj
as the proportionate change in tariffs τ isj
relative to the proportionate changes in the multilateral resistance (MR) terms. When examining
trade policy, it is important to take into account that the multilateral resistance (MR) terms will
change along with the tariffs. Therefore, Equation (17) not only examines the impact of
dτ isj
τ isj
but also that of dΠ
is
Πis and
dP sj
P sj
. As it is relative tariffs that matter rather than absolute tariffs to
determine a country’s global competitiveness, individual tariff changes should be compared with
changes in the average tariff, which is captured by the multilateral resistance terms. Suppose, for
instance, that the UK tariff on Belgian goods goes up with 3%. If the UK further raises its tariffs
on all its other trading partners with 2%, the “real” or “relative” increases in the BE-UK tariff is
only 1% (3% - 2%). Therefore, what matters for a country-sector’s production change dvakz is the
tariff change it faces relative to the tariff change its competitors face.
Under Brexit, the only countries that are likely to face increased tariffs from the UK are the EU-27,
whereas the tariffs the UK imposes on its other trading partners such as the US will not change.
16In this application, any effect of the exchange rate on EU-UK trade is disregarded. We acknowledge that
exchange rates have an important impact on the relative price of UK exports worldwide (and thus in the EU),
possibly offsetting any change in tariffs. However, as major exporting firms tend to be major importing firms as well
(see, for instance, Amiti et al., 2014), the depreciated pound will increase their production cost which will translate
in higher export prices.
17See the Appendix for a detailed derivation.
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This means that US goods will become relatively less expensive for the UK, even though the UK
tariffs on US imports do not change. The reason is that Brexit actually decreases (i.e. τˆUS,sUK < 0)
the “relative” US-UK trade costs compared to EU-UK trade costs. As a result, some trade will be
diverted from the EU27-UK to the US-UK. The MR changes dΠ
is
Πis and
dP sj
P sj
are essential for trade
diversion to happen. We can see this by disentangling the change τˆ isj into its different components,
namely the tariff change and the MR changes:
dvakz = − vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
dτ isj
τ isj
eisj︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade destruction effect
+ vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
[
dΠis
Πis
+
dP sj
P sj
]
eisj︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade diversion effect
(18)
Equation (18) shows that the change in kz’s value added production after a change in trade costs τ
is a combination of a “trade destruction effect” (-) as a result of higher tariffs and a “trade diversion
effect” (+) caused by the change in the multilateral resistance terms.
On the one hand, the “trade destruction effect” measures the drop in vakz that is caused by the
reduced trade between any country-sector is and country j. This drop depends on how the output
of country-sector kz is used by country i’s sector s, as it is the latter sector’s exports that will face
increased protectionist measures from country j.
The “trade diversion effect”, on the other hand, is driven by two channels. First, country-sector is
will divert some of its exports away from j to alternative destinations that do not impose tariffs on
its goods, since these destinations have now become relatively more attractive (i.e. less expensive)
for is to export to. This is caused by the increase in is’ outward MR term Πis. Second, the fact that
j increases the tariffs on its imports will raise the average price in market j which makes the market
less competitive, captured by the increase in j’s inward MR term P sj . As a result, any country i
will find it easier to export to country j. Both the first and second channel of trade diversion
increase the exports of is and hence its production, which results in an increase in its demand for
inputs from country-sector kz, which in turn increases the latter’s value added production vakz.
Therefore, the “trade diversion effect” will mitigate some of the negative “trade destruction effect”
on vakz. The results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The change in kz’s value added production after a trade shock depends on two
effects. First, the negative “trade destruction effect” indicates that the loss in vakz depends on kz’s
connection with each exporting country-sector is. The drop in vakz will be greater, (i) the higher
is the trade elasticity in sector s (higher (σs − 1)); (ii) the greater is the increase in protection
imposed by j on sector s goods originating in country i (higher
dτ isj
τ isj
); (iii) the greater is the
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production interlinkage of kz with is (higher Lkzis ) and (iv) the stronger is the direct bilateral trade
relation in both final and intermediate goods between i and j in sector s. Second, these negative
effects will be mitigated through the “trade diversion” channel, as some of kz’s production will be
used in exports that are diverted to different destinations after the trade shock.
Equation (18) sums up the effects of a trade shock on vakz. It characterizes all the different channels
through which a trade shock can affect a sector’s output. It is clear that the impact of a trade
shock such as Brexit on a given sector can be very different depending on a number of determinants
that vary by sector. Strong production interlinkages (high L) with a large exporting sector (high e)
do not necessarily lead to large production losses (through the “trade destruction effect”) in case
this sector produces differentiated goods (making it insensitive to price changes, i.e. σ is low) or
experiences only minor tariff increases (small dττ ). Accounting for this sectoral heterogeneity in a
model with a closed-form solution on the effects of a tariff shock, contributes to the literature in an
important way.
In the next section, we will apply our model to a specific trade shock. We will compute the
production and employment effects of Brexit, in which the EU and the UK impose tariffs on each
other’s goods.
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3. Methodology
This section takes the model to the data and simulates the effects of different scenarios of Brexit
using input-output data from WIOD. For expositional simplicity, we explain the methodology by
focusing on the effects of unilateral UK protection on EU goods, but the analysis is symmetric for
EU protection against UK imports. We will investigate the impact on kz’s production when the
UK imposes tariffs on EU goods using Equation (18)1819.
Equation (18) consists of a trade destruction and diversion effect, where the latter derives from
the changes in multilateral resistance (MR) terms. These MR terms are not observable, and not
controlling for them in gravity estimation is what Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) call “the gold medal
of classic gravity model mistakes”. Empirically, there are several ways to deal with the issue of
MR, see for instance Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and Novy
(2013). Hummels (1999) and Feenstra (2015) suggest to control for MR using directional (exporter
and importer) fixed effects in a gravity model based on past data series. However, in our analysis
of Brexit, where we simulate the model to engage in future predictions, the inclusion of fixed effects
is not an option. The empirical findings in the literature on the magnitude of the trade diversion
effect of import tariffs are ambiguous but seem to suggest that trade diversion effects tend to
18Note that empirically we account for retaliation i.e. we consider both tariffs imposed by the UK as well as tariffs
imposed by the EU-27, when computing losses in value added produced and jobs for each country involved. Put
differently, we assume that in the case of a “hard” Brexit, the EU-27 also imposes MFN tariffs on UK goods of the
same magnitude as the UK does. To simplify the exposition here, we focus on the case where the UK imposes tariffs
because the analysis is completely symmetric for any other EU-27 country involved in Brexit. Further, we make the
likely assumption that non-EU relationships remain unchanged after Brexit.
19Our model only captures the static effects of a trade shock and it does not include dynamic effects such as access
to foreign markets, firm investment and innovation, capital mobility and migration. In terms of the time horizon,
we assume all effects to occur immediately after Brexit happens. However, it should be noted that it can take some
time for our simulated outcomes to arise. Especially non-tariff barriers (NTBs) can have a lagged effect. Jung (2012)
estimated that an adjustment period of 10 to 12 years could be in order. In which case the full effect of our simulated
outcomes would be expected around 2030, which is also the time horizon adopted by most other Brexit papers.
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be small20. Indeed, in order to divert trade, new business contacts have to be established, new
contracts negotiated and so on, which takes some time to materialize. In our Brexit application,
we therefore concentrate on the short-run effects and restrict Equation (18) to the first term that
measures the “trade destruction effect”. This is the first-order trade effect, which captures the main
effects resulting from the Brexit’s tariff changes. The drop in value added production as a result of
increased UK trade protection on EU goods (higher τEU,sUK ) under Brexit will thus be approximated
by
dvakz ≈ −vkz
N∑
i∈EU
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)dτ
EU,s
UK
τEU,sUK
Lkzis e
is
UK
Within this trade destruction effect we can now distinguish two different channels of value added
loss by decomposing the trade destruction effect of UK protection into “direct” and “indirect”
losses. These refer, respectively, to the losses in value added of country-sector kz stemming from
direct bilateral trade (in goods and services) with the UK and the value added losses arising through
its production linkages with other affected sectors in other EU-27 countries. For any country-sector
kz, the loss in vakz can be decomposed into a “direct” and “indirect” loss as follows
dvakz ≈ − vkz
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)dτ
EU,s
UK
τEU,sUK
Lkzkse
ks
UK︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct loss
− vkz
N∑
i∈EU\{k}
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)dτ
EU,s
UK
τEU,sUK
Lkzis e
is
UK︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect loss
(19)
Equation (19) thus captures the effect on vakz of increased UK trade protection on EU-27 goods
and services. Similarly, the effects of increased EU-27 protection on UK goods and services can be
obtained from equation (19) by simply reversing the country of origin and destination21. In Section
4 we present both effects separately and combined to give an idea of the total effect of Brexit on
EU-27 and UK value added production and employment.
20There appears to be no consensus in the literature on the magnitude of trade diversion effects. Dai et al. (2014)
use manufacturing trade data for 64 countries and find that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) divert trade, particularly
on the import-side. However, Magee (2008) using different gravity specifications estimates of the trade diversion
effects of regional agreements to be small and their significance to depend on the specification used. Similarly,
Soloaga and Wintersb (2001) found evidence of export diversion in a minority of FTAs i.e. only 2 out of 9 FTAs
analyzed had substantial trade diversion. Dhingra et al. (2017) estimates the potential gains by non-EU countries
arising from the reduced trade between the EU-27 and the UK. The non-EU gains turn out to be very small,
approximately between 0.01 and 0.02% of GDP. Therefore, the mitigation effects of trade diversion are likely to be
small.
21Note that our theoretical framework predicts a loss in UK production even if we only consider trade protection
imposed by the UK itself. The main mechanism is that it increases the price of (EU-27) inputs for UK firms and it
decreases the demand for UK inputs that are embedded in EU-27 goods and services destined to the UK consumer.
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3.1. Value Added Production Losses
In order to obtain an estimate of the value added losses, Equation (19) indicates that five key
variables are needed. The five determinants in this equation are retrieved from various sources:
(i) the the value added share vkz, the Leontief coefficient Lkzis and the direct trade flows e
is
UK are
variables from WIOD; (ii) the trade elasticities at sector-level σs are borrowed from the literature
and (iii) the change in trade barriers τ are obtained from potential Brexit scenarios that circulate
in the literature. In order to obtain the job losses corresponding with the loss in value added in
production, we turn to Eurostat data on EU-27 and UK sectoral level employment. Using sectoral
employment elasticities from the literature, we obtain the corresponding job losses.
3.1.1. Input-Output Data
The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) contains detailed information on the global value chains
of 44 world countries, including an approximation for the rest of the world, and 56 sectors with the
latest year being 201422.
For each country-sector, WIOD provides its total production, the inputs it needs from other country-
sectors and how much of its output is used by other country-sectors in their production process. The
first variable that we obtain from WIOD is the value added share of country-sector kz’s production,
vkz. This captures the value added, obtained as gross output minus gross intermediate inputs, per
unit of gross output. We also obtain the Leontief coefficients, Lkzis from WIOD, which are obtained
using Equation (14). In addition, again from WIOD we obtain the direct trade flows eisj from
country is to country j, which are obtained by summing exports from is that are destined to
country j to satisfy its final and intermediate demand.
3.1.2. Trade Elasticities
Another determinant which the losses from Brexit depend on is the sector-level trade elasticity. A
trade elasticity measures the proportionate decrease in demand after a 1% increase in trade costs.
It captures the idea that higher UK tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) will increase the price
of EU-27 products in the UK (and vice versa), which will lower UK consumers’ demand of EU-27
goods as they substitute away to products of cheaper origin. This is captured by the elasticity of
22Alternatively, other databases used in the literature are the ”Global Trade Analysis Project Database”, ”OECD
Input-Output Tables” or the ”WTO-OECD TiVA Database.
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substitution σs in sector s, from which the trade elasticity is derived as σs − 1. As a result, the
extent to which production decreases after Brexit depends on the trade elasticity.
The literature has shown that trade elasticities typically vary both across countries and sectors.
For example, Imbs and Me´jean (2017) use product-level gross export flows between 1995-2004 to
estimate trade elasticities, based on a multi-sector model developed by Arkolakis et al. (2012) and
Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2013). They confirm that there is considerable heterogeneity in
trade elasticities across countries and sectors. Using aggregate data, they find that the average
trade elasticity within the EU countries is -2.98 with a minimum of -2.11 for Germany and a
maximum of -4.83 for Greece23. Using more disaggregated data, they find that, within countries,
trade elasticities also vary across products and consequently across sectors. Using their estimates,
we find that Germany has an average elasticity across 11 manufacturing sectors of -5.1, with a
median of -4.7 and maximum and minimum of -11.1 and -3.2, respectively24. In order to allow for
the heterogeneity across sectors that is present in the theoretical framework, we use the average
trade elasticies across countries at a sectoral level given that Imbs and Me´jean (2017) do not report
estimates of trade elasticities for every EU country-sector. In this way, we obtain elasticities for 16
different manufacturing sectors. For the remaining sectors we assign a trade elasticity of −4 which
is a lower-end estimate of the trade elasticities reported in earlier literature. However, given that
we analyze trade in value added rather than gross flows and that our data are at sector-level and
not at product-level, we prefer to use the lower-end estimate of the trade elasticity. Therefore, the
simulation results that we obtain can be regarded as lower bound estimates25. We assume complete
pass-through of tariffs into domestic prices (congruent with the model). While our results depend
on the choice of the trade elasticity, what has to be kept in mind is that our results vary linearly
with the trade elasticity i.e. doubling the trade elasticity in every sector, doubles the value added
losses from Brexit. Results depend monotonically on the trade elasticity parameters.
23For more information, see Table 4 in Imbs and Me´jean (2017).
24In our analysis, we use a sectoral aggregation at 2 digit in Nace Rev. 2. For this reason, we use the Reference and
Management of Nomenclatures tables (RAMON) provided by Eurostat to find the correspondence of the estimates
provided by Imbs and Me´jean (2017) who use ISIC3 as their product classification.
25Other trade elasticities estimates in the literature confirm this heterogeneity. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) use
trade data to estimate a demand elasticity of -6.43, while Broda et al. (2006) use ten-digit HS data to obtain price
elasticities of around -12. A recent paper by Cos¸ar et al. (2016) uses a trade elasticity of -5.66. Ossa (2015) estimates
sector level trade elasticities which range between -1.54 and -25.05.
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3.1.3. Potential Brexit Scenarios
Equation (19) and the resulting losses in value added hinge on the increase in trade barriers i.e.
dτEU,sUK
τEU,sUK
. We consider two Brexit scenarios, an optimistic (“soft Brexit”) and a pessimistic (“hard
Brexit”) scenario. We refer to Dhingra et al. (2017) for more details on these scenarios. In short, in
the “soft Brexit” scenario, the UK continues to belong to the EU Single Market and tariffs remain
zero, while non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) increase by 2.77%26. The scenarios are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1: Imposed tariffs and NTBs in both scenarios of Brexit.
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
Tariff 0% MFN tariff
Non-tariff barrier 2.77% 8.31%
Note: The scenarios are based on Dhingra et al. (2017).
In a “hard” Brexit scenario, the UK leaves the Single Market and trade between the EU-27 countries
and the UK is governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. This implies an increase in
trade tariffs from the current level of 0% to the sectoral ”applied tariffs” imposed under the Most
Favored Nations (MFN) clause, which differ by sector. These MFN tariffs are the tariffs that are
currently imposed on goods traded between the United States and the EU, for instance. In Figure
1, we present the unweighted current MFN tariffs according to WTO rules in the sectors contained
in the WIOD database. These are the MFN tariffs from the EU perspective, i.e. those that the
EU imposes on imports from abroad. In the “hard Brexit” scenario, we assume EU-UK and UK-
EU trade to be subject to an increase in the trade tariffs on goods from 0% to the unweighted
average MFN tariff in each sector that ranges from 0% in “Mining and quarrying”, “Forestry” and
“Electricity and Gas” to 9.1% in the case of Fishing products. Figure 1 gives an overview of the
MFN tariffs that currently apply to trade between members of the WTO. Moreover, we assume
that under a “hard Brexit” NTBs rise further to a tariff equivalent of 8.31%27.
26This is similar to the case of Norway whose NTBs with the EU are 2.11% higher than for the EU members. The
2.77% is taken from Dhingra et al. (2017). They compute a weighted average tariff equivalent for the current NTBs
on US-EU trade, which amounts to 20.4%. Given that only 54% of this tariff equivalent is reducible, they only take
into account an NTB tariff equivalent of ca. 11%. In the optimistic Brexit scenario, Dhingra et al. (2017) assume
that the EU-UK trade will be subject to a NTB that is only one quarter of the one on EU-US trade, resulting in a
tariff equivalent of 2.77%.
27This corresponds to three quarters of the NTB on EU-US trade, see Dhingra et al. (2017).
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Figure 1: MFN tariffs imposed by the European Union
Note: The upper (lower) bound corresponds to the highest (lowest) tariff imposed within the HS6 classified in a Nace.rev
2 sector. The red dotted line marks the unweighted average tariff of all the HS6 where the European Union reports a tariff
to the Most-Favored-Nations (MFNs). Information on the current tariffs applied are collected using the WTO Integrated
Data Base (IDB). This database contains information on the applied tariffs at the standard codes of the Harmonized
System (HS) for all the WTO Members. In this exercise, we use the Reference and Management of Nomenclatures
(RAMON) correspondence tables to classify the equivalent Combined Nomenclature (CN) to the respective CPA 2008
code. In 35 of 5051 HS6 codes considered, the HS6 corresponded to multiply CPA 2008 codes.
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3.2. Employment Losses
Combining the data gathered in the previous sections with Equation (19), we obtain the total value
added production loss dvakz in country k’s sector z. In order to transform these production losses
in job losses, we need an employment elasticity. This elasticity measures the proportionate drop
in employment after a 1% decrease in value added production. In our theoretical framework, our
production function is characterized by constant return to scale. In theory, Hamermesh (1986)
argued that a production function characterized by constant returns to scale is identified by
an elasticity of 1. However, this differs from empirical evidence. Konings and Murphy (2006)
use European firm level data and report employment elasticities with respect to value added for
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors below 1. They find the range of average employment
elasticities between 0.57 and 0.72 in manufacturing sectors and 0.33 in non-manufacturing sectors.
Given that we also focus on European data, we use the lower bound of these sectoral estimates to
obtain the effect of Brexit on employment. This implies that for every 1% drop in domestically
produced value added, we assume employment to go down by 0.57 % in manufacturing and 0.33%
in non-manufacturing sectors. Similar to the trade elasticities, the Brexit results on employment
depend linearly on the choice of the employment elasticity. Thus, once we have obtained the relative
drop in employment from the decrease in production, we can compute the absolute number of jobs
lost by multiplying by the country-sector’s total employment base28.
28Throughout the analysis, we assume that any job lost in the UK is not going to move to the EU-27 and vice
versa.
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4. Results
Our approach is a simulation exercise rather than a regression type of analysis since we cannot
use past data to estimate the hypothetical impact of Brexit given the unprecedented nature of this
event29. For this reason, we use our theoretical model to make projections about the potential
effects from different scenarios of Brexit.
From the theoretical model we know that the UK’s consumption of EU-27 products will decrease
after the introduction of import tariffs by the UK. Given that EU-27 producers also use UK inputs
in their own production, some of the UK’s own value added will go lost when it imposes import
tariffs on EU-27 goods and services. For example, take a German car manufacturer that uses a UK
insurance as part of its inputs. The introduction of an import tariff on German cars by the UK
will decrease the demand for German cars in the UK, subsequently also decreasing the demand for
UK insurance. The same mechanism applies to the introduction of import tariffs by the EU-27 on
UK goods and services.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the economic impact of tariffs imposed by the UK on EU-27 products
in terms of value added and employment. Both tables contain information on the potential losses
for the EU-27 individual countries and the UK, which are obtained by summing across all sectors
within the country. We distinguish between a “soft” and a “hard” Brexit, respectively. Columns
(1) and (2) in both tables show the absolute value, in terms of millions of dollars and thousand of
people, that would be hypothetically lost in a “soft” Brexit scenario. Whereas Column (1) shows
the direct losses for each EU-27 country from lower direct bilateral trade with the UK, Column
(2) identifies the losses from reduced indirect trade with the UK via other EU-27 countries. The
sum of both channels is found in Column (3). To normalize the magnitude of the loss by country
size, Column (4) expresses it as a percentage of the total value added (and employment) of the
country30. The remainder of the columns document the losses in a “hard” Brexit scenario. It has
to be kept in mind that our analysis has been entirely carried out at the sectoral level, whereas in
the tables we have aggregated the sector-level effects at the country-level.
For each of the 28 European countries, Table 4 lists the most affected sector in terms of value
added and employment. This sector can differ depending on whether we express losses in terms of
value added or employment. The reason is that the value added contribution per worker can differ
29The majority of the bilateral tariffs between European countries have remained unchanged between the period
2000-2014.
30Total Value Added (TVA) for each country is obtained using the WIOD database.
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dramatically across sectors, which means that the same drop in value added might lead to different
employment effects in different sectors.
Similarly to the previous tables, Tables 5, 6 and 7 summarize the economic impact of tariffs imposed
by the EU-27 countries on the UK. As mentioned above, sectors in the EU-27 countries will be
affected by tariffs imposed by the EU-27 on the UK as a part of the production of the EU-27
sectors is embedded in UK exports back to EU-27 countries.
Tables 8 and 9 display the total losses from Brexit, obtained by summing the effects from both UK
protection against EU-27 and EU-27 protection against the UK. The results indicate that the UK
is hit relatively harder than the rest of the EU-27 in both the “soft” and “hard” Brexit scenario.
In either case, Brexit reduces economic activity in the UK three times more than in the EU-27.
The UK will experience a drop in value added production as a percentage of GDP of 1.21% under
a “soft” Brexit and up to 4.47% under a “hard” Brexit scenario. This corresponds to UK job losses
of 139,860 jobs in the “soft” Brexit and 526,830 jobs in the “hard” Brexit scenario. For the EU-27,
the absolute job losses are larger, with the numbers of EU-27 jobs lost from Brexit varying between
284,440 jobs and 1,209,470 jobs respectively which corresponds to value added losses as a percentage
of GDP of 0.38% for the “soft” and 1.54% for the “hard” Brexit. The losses in value added and jobs
differ substantially across EU-27 member states. EU-27 member states that lose most are countries
with close historical ties to the UK (e.g. Ireland, Malta) and small open economies (e.g. Belgium
and the Netherlands).
For each EU country, Table 10 shows the sector that will be most affected under a “hard” Brexit
scenario, which is based on both the direct and indirect effects. These most affected sectors may
differ from the ones mentioned in other Brexit studies because in our analysis we have accounted
for input-output linkages between goods and services sectors, allowing us to get a more complete
picture of the effects of a trade shock. For example, in terms of value added the most affected
sector in Germany is “Motor Vehicles”, while in terms of employment losses it is “Machinery &
Equipment”. For the UK (GBR), “Wholesale Trade” is the sector most affected by Brexit in terms
of value added, while in terms of job losses it is the service sector “Administrative and support
activities”.
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5. Discussion
This section compares our results with those found by other papers that investigate the potential
impact of Brexit. Emerson et al. (2017) summarize the results of six papers, three academic papers
and three from official sources31. These studies each consider an optimistic and a pessimistic Brexit
scenario that correspond closely to our “soft” and “hard” Brexit scenarios. An important difference
is that most of these papers predict the Brexit effects to be fully materialized after a period of about
10 years. Therefore, most of them set the time horizon at the year 2030. In contrast, our approach
does not make any assumption on the transition period that is needed to adjust to the new economic
climate. The results that we present are the outcome of a static analysis. Therefore, we do not
project the impact of Brexit and how that would occur over time, instead we obtain the immediate
overall effects that can be expected to materialize.
When we compare our results to the average effect obtained in earlier studies that also consider the
impact of Brexit on the EU-27 32, our simulated value added losses for the EU-27 are approximately
three times higher. We find the absolute loss in value added production for the EU-27 to be 1.7
times larger than the UK losses. In a way this should not come as a surprise given that the EU-27
is a much larger economy than the UK. Given the size of the EU-27 economy and the UK’s large
trade deficit with the EU-27, it seems likely that the EU-27 would suffer larger absolute losses than
the UK, but this is not what other studies have found. In earlier studies, the absolute losses for the
UK were always higher than for the EU-27.
A potential explanation for the larger absolute losses for the EU-27 in our study is the inclusion of
indirect effects. Throughout the paper, we have extensively argued the importance of considering
global value chains and value added trade flows rather than bilateral direct gross flows. The indirect
losses from Brexit (e.g. decreased Belgian steel production due to reduced German car exports to
the UK) are estimated to be very important, amounting to ca. one third of the direct effects33.
This is likely to cause the divergence between our results and the other results that circulate in the
literature. Our model simulation is bound to yield greater estimated losses given that it captures all
31See Ottaviano et al. (2014), Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), the OECD study by Kierzenkowski et al. (2016),
Rojas-Romagosa (2016), Booth et al. (2015) and HMTreasury (2016).
32See, for instance, Rojas-Romagosa (2016), Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), Booth et al. (2015) and Ottaviano
et al. (2014).
33Tables 2 and 3 display the predicted losses in terms of value added and employment associated with a tariff
imposed by the UK on EU-27 goods and services. In these tables, we distinguish between direct and indirect effects
as observed by columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). The relative importance of direct and indirect effects differs greatly
across countries.
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indirect channels through which a country-sector can be affected in addition to the direct channels
captured in the literature. Moreover, our study contains information for all the services sectors,
which are typically embedded in many manufactured goods. For sectors within services, the indirect
channels are very important which corresponds to an important source of the high losses found in
our analysis.
The sector-level dimension of our analysis solves the potential bias obtained in country-level analysis
that omits the sectoral structure of an economy. While we present aggregate results at the country-
level, it should be noted that these were obtained by summing the sector-level effects, which gives
us the total country-level losses from Brexit. This differs from other studies that do not consider
the sector-level dimension (see, for instance, the model in Noguera, 2012).
Our results, however, are very comparable in terms of the relative losses. In line with other studies,
we find the UK to be hit with value added losses that are three times as high as the EU-27 losses,
when normalizing by country size.
Our estimates on value added and job losses do not include potential FDI effects of Brexit. Various
papers however, seem to suggest that trade effects account for the main part of the Brexit impact34.
This is reassuring as it suggests that the main effects of Brexit come through the trade channel
which is what we focus on in this paper. Not including the FDI effects, suggests that our estimates
are lower bound estimates of the true impact that Brexit may have, which should be kept in mind35.
34See the OECD study by Kierzenkowski et al. (2016), HMTreasury (2016), Dhingra et al. (2017), PwC (2016),
Oxford-Economics (2016).
35For many multinationals, the UK has been an attractive FDI destination as a way to get access to the EU Single
Market given its business-friendly climate (See Dhingra et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion on the impact on FDI).
With the UK leaving the EU, part of this foreign investment will likely be (temporarily) suspended, or diverted to
the other EU-27 member states. For instance, the UK will be a less attractive export platform once it leaves the
Single Market, as different regulation and standards will complicate the coordination between the UK headquarter
and the EU-27 branches.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper we develop and explicitly solve a trade model with worldwide sector-level input-output
linkages in production. The model allows us to separately identify all the channels through which
tariff changes operate. This results in a new gravity model that overcomes the limitations of a
traditional gravity approach and that derives closed form solutions which allow for comparative
statics on tariff changes.
In contrast to a traditional gravity approach that solely rests on direct gross exports between
bilateral trade partners, our model includes (1) domestic and global value chain linkages between
goods and services sectors, (2) bilateral tariffs that affect direct production for a final destination as
well as indirect production (shipped via third countries) to a final destination and (3) value added
rather than gross production. Including input-output linkages implies that domestic production of
intermediates can serve as inputs in foreign products and subsequently be exported “indirectly”
to a final destination. Our input-output model can be taken to the sectoral World Input Output
Database (WIOD) and can be used to evaluate trade policy. In this paper, we use the theoretical
framework to simulate the impact of different scenarios of Brexit in terms of value added and
employment for each of the 28 individual countries involved.
From the sectoral World Input Output (WIOD) database, we obtain Leontief input-output
coefficients, value added shares in production and trade flows, which we complement with trade and
employment elasticities obtained from the literature. These are all the variables needed to simulate
the model’s predictions on trade destruction effects resulting from the different scenarios of Brexit.
We consider both a “soft” Brexit, where the UK continues to be part of the single market but faces
increased non-tariff barriers (NTBs) (the “Norwegian scenario”), as well as a “hard” Brexit scenario
where Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariffs between the EU-27 and the UK are put in place. Our
model simulations indicate that the UK is hit relatively harder than the rest of the EU-27 in both
scenarios. In either case, Brexit reduces economic activity in the UK three times more than in the
EU-27.
The UK will experience a drop in value added production as a percentage of GDP of 1.21% under
a “soft” Brexit and up to 4.47% under a “hard” Brexit scenario. This corresponds to UK job losses
of around 140,000 jobs in the “soft” Brexit and ca. 530,000 jobs in the “hard” Brexit scenario.
For the EU-27, the absolute job losses are larger, with the numbers of EU-27 jobs lost from Brexit
varying between ca. 280,000 and 1,200,000 jobs, which corresponds to value added losses as a
percentage of GDP of 0.38% for the “soft” and 1.54% for the “hard” Brexit. The losses in value
27
added and jobs differ substantially across EU-27 member states. EU-27 member states that stand
to lose most from Brexit are countries with close historical ties to the UK (e.g. Ireland, Malta) and
small open economies on the European continent (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands).
We find that Brexit hits the UK relatively harder than the EU-27. Nonetheless, in contrast to other
studies, we find the absolute losses for the EU-27 to be substantially higher both in terms of value
added and jobs lost.
The Brexit impact varies across countries due to differences in sectoral composition. As shown by
Acemoglu et al. (2012), it is the network centrality of sectors that determines the impact of an
aggregate shock through a “cascade effect” in the input-output network. Under Brexit, we consider
different tariffs across sectors, and therefore the propagation of tariff shocks differs depending on
the sectoral composition of the economy. A sector that only has a few linkages with other sectors
may not affect aggregate output much even when it is subject to high tariffs, as opposed to a sector
that is very central in the production network. Our results take the network centrality and the
number of sectoral production linkages into account when estimating the loss in value added and
jobs caused by Brexit.
Our findings indicate that there are no winners from Brexit, but only losers. Both parties involved
would suffer substantial losses if denied free trade access to each other’s market. However, while
the current belief surrounding Brexit is that especially the UK has a great deal to lose, our sector-
level input-output approach clearly shows that the EU-27 also stands to lose substantially and
considerably more than previously thought. The reason is that EU-27 production networks are
closely integrated, which implies that tariff changes with the UK do not just affect direct trade
bilateral flows but also indirect trade flows via third countries. These indirect effects are estimated
to be very important (typically amounting to ca. one third of the direct effects), which substantially
reinforces the trade destruction effects of Brexit.
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Table 4: Most affected sector across countries: UK protection against the EU-27 (Hard Brexit Scenario)
Country
Sector Nace Rev.2
Value Added (VA) Employment (EMP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT Machinery & Equipment C28 Metal products C25
BEL Food Product C10-C12 Food Product C10-C12
BGR Textiles C13-C15 Live Animals A01
CYP Financial Services K64 Administrative and support act. N
CZE Electronics and Computers C26 Metal products C25
DEU Motor vehicles C29 Machinery & Equipment C28
DNK Food Product C10-C12 Food Product C10-C12
ESP Food Product C10-C12 Live Animals A01
EST Wood and Cork C16 Textiles C13-C15
FIN Paper Products C17 Machinery & Equipment C28
FRA Administrative and support act. N Administrative and support act. N
GBR Wholesale trade G46 Administrative and support act. N
GRC Water transport H50 Live Animals A01
HRV Other services R S Metal products C25
HUN Electronics and Computers C26 Electronics and Computers C26
IRL Food Product C10-C12 Live Animals A01
ITA Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
LTU Petroleum Products C19 Textiles C13-C15
LUX Financial Services K64 Administrative and support act. N
LVA Wood and Cork C16 Administrative and support act. N
MLT Other services R S Other services R S
NLD Wholesale trade G46 Administrative and support act. N
POL Wholesale trade G46 Live Animals A01
PRT Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
ROU Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
SVK Real Estate L68 Metal products C25
SVN Metal products C25 Metal products C25
SWE Machinery & Equipment C28 Machinery & Equipment C28
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations and sector codes.
Note: The most affected sector can differ depending on whether we look in terms of value added or employment. The
reason is that the value added contribution per worker can differ dramatically across sectors, which means that the
same drop in value added might lead to different employment effects in different sectors.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely
underestimate the true impact.
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Table 5: Loss in Value Added (VA) as a result of EU-27 protection against the UK
Country
via GBR
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
(million $) (% of total VA) (million $) (% of total VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT -71 -0.017% -286 -0.071%
BEL -207 -0.041% -836 -0.167%
BGR -10 -0.018% -38 -0.072%
CYP -4 -0.018% -15 -0.068%
CZE -60 -0.030% -240 -0.121%
DEU -1038 -0.029% -4207 -0.116%
DNK -96 -0.030% -365 -0.115%
ESP -168 -0.013% -683 -0.052%
EST -5 -0.022% -21 -0.085%
FIN -52 -0.021% -208 -0.084%
FRA -611 -0.023% -2392 -0.090%
GRC -19 -0.009% -72 -0.033%
HRV -6 -0.012% -25 -0.048%
HUN -38 -0.030% -151 -0.119%
IRL -162 -0.069% -670 -0.283%
ITA -326 -0.016% -1301 -0.065%
LTU -10 -0.022% -42 -0.092%
LUX -20 -0.033% -77 -0.126%
LVA -7 -0.026% -29 -0.099%
MLT -4 -0.045% -16 -0.166%
NLD -492 -0.059% -1897 -0.229%
POL -138 -0.027% -557 -0.109%
PRT -34 -0.016% -135 -0.063%
ROU -26 -0.014% -104 -0.055%
SVK -26 -0.027% -100 -0.103%
SVN -8 -0.019% -34 -0.075%
SWE -136 -0.026% -540 -0.101%
EU-27 -3777 -0.026% -15042 -0.103%
GBR -32528 -1.159% -119161 -4.246%
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations.
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Table 6: Loss in Employment (EMP) as a result of EU-27 protection against the UK
Country
via GBR
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
(1000 pers) (% of total EMP) (1000 pers) (% of total EMP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT -0.27 -0.006% -1.11 -0.03%
BEL -0.67 -0.015% -2.72 -0.06%
BGR -0.27 -0.008% -1.11 -0.03%
CYP -0.02 -0.005% -0.07 -0.02%
CZE -0.67 -0.013% -2.70 -0.05%
DEU -4.50 -0.011% -18.29 -0.04%
DNK -0.26 -0.009% -0.99 -0.04%
ESP -0.88 -0.005% -3.58 -0.02%
EST -0.05 -0.009% -0.20 -0.03%
FIN -0.19 -0.008% -0.77 -0.03%
FRA -2.40 -0.009% -9.39 -0.03%
GRC -0.10 -0.002% -0.38 -0.01%
HRV -0.08 -0.005% -0.32 -0.02%
HUN -0.46 -0.011% -1.85 -0.04%
IRL -0.68 -0.035% -3.17 -0.16%
ITA -1.67 -0.007% -6.74 -0.03%
LTU -0.09 -0.007% -0.38 -0.03%
LUX -0.04 -0.010% -0.14 -0.04%
LVA -0.01 -0.003% -0.04 -0.01%
MLT -0.02 -0.012% -0.07 -0.05%
NLD -1.48 -0.017% -5.75 -0.07%
POL -1.66 -0.011% -6.75 -0.04%
PRT -0.30 -0.007% -1.20 -0.03%
ROU -0.48 -0.006% -2.00 -0.02%
SVK -0.21 -0.009% -0.81 -0.04%
SVN -0.07 -0.008% -0.30 -0.03%
SWE -0.39 -0.009% -1.55 -0.03%
EU-27 -17.94 -0.009% -72.41 -0.04%
GBR -133.85 -0.435% -500.74 -1.63%
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely
underestimate the true impact.
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Table 7: Most affected sector across countries: EU-27 protection against the UK (Hard Brexit Scenario)
Country
Sector Nace Rev.2
Value Added (VA) Employment (EMP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT Wholesale trade G46 Metal products C25
BEL Chemicals C20 Administrative and support act. N
BGR Wholesale trade G46 Live Animals A01
CYP Financial Services K64 Administrative and support act. N
CZE Motor vehicles C29 Metal products C25
DEU Chemicals C20 Administrative and support act. N
DNK Mining and quarrying B Administrative and support act. N
ESP Chemicals C20 Administrative and support act. N
EST Wood and Cork C16 Metal products C25
FIN Paper Products C17 Paper Products C17
FRA Administrative and support act. N Administrative and support act. N
GBR Administrative and support act. N Administrative and support act. N
GRC Water transport H50 Wholesale trade G46
HRV Wholesale trade G46 Metal products C25
HUN Motor vehicles C29 Motor vehicles C29
IRL Live Animals A01 Live Animals A01
ITA Administrative and support act. N Administrative and support act. N
LTU Chemicals C20 Live Animals A01
LUX Financial Services K64 Administrative and support act. N
LVA Wood and Cork C16 Administrative and support act. N
MLT Financial Services K64 Financial Services K64
NLD Wholesale trade G46 Administrative and support act. N
POL Wholesale trade G46 Retail trade G47
PRT Wholesale trade G46 Administrative and support act. N
ROU Land & Pipeline transport H49 Live Animals A01
SVK Real Estate L68 Metal products C25
SVN Metal products C25 Metal products C25
SWE Chemicals C20 Administrative and support act. N
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations and sector codes.
Note: The most affected sector can differ depending on whether we look in terms of value added or employment. The
reason is that the value added contribution per worker can differ dramatically across sectors, which means that the
same drop in value added might lead to different employment effects in different sectors.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely
underestimate the true impact.
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Table 8: Total loss in Value Added from Brexit
Country
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
(million $) (% of total VA) (million $) (% of total VA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT -995 -0.25% -4016 -0.99%
BEL -2899 -0.58% -11782 -2.35%
BGR -127 -0.24% -512 -0.97%
CYP -67 -0.31% -222 -1.02%
CZE -952 -0.48% -3985 -2.01%
DEU -15364 -0.42% -63699 -1.76%
DNK -1362 -0.43% -5283 -1.67%
ESP -2749 -0.21% -11902 -0.91%
EST -68 -0.28% -257 -1.04%
FIN -633 -0.25% -2348 -0.95%
FRA -8376 -0.32% -33190 -1.25%
GRC -233 -0.11% -831 -0.38%
HRV -94 -0.18% -355 -0.69%
HUN -554 -0.44% -2256 -1.78%
IRL -3077 -1.30% -13575 -5.74%
ITA -5713 -0.29% -24599 -1.23%
LTU -157 -0.34% -653 -1.42%
LUX -260 -0.43% -919 -1.51%
LVA -91 -0.31% -343 -1.19%
MLT -153 -1.56% -476 -4.86%
NLD -5604 -0.68% -21523 -2.59%
POL -2110 -0.41% -8618 -1.68%
PRT -570 -0.26% -2494 -1.16%
ROU -418 -0.22% -1775 -0.95%
SVK -520 -0.53% -1939 -1.99%
SVN -115 -0.25% -461 -1.02%
SWE -1742 -0.33% -6596 -1.24%
EU-27 -55004 -0.38% -224609 -1.54%
GBR -34012 -1.21% -125497 -4.47%
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations.
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Table 9: Total loss in Employment from Brexit
Country
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
(1000 pers) (% of total EMP) (1000 pers) (% of total EMP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT -4.12 -0.10% -17.02 -0.40%
BEL -10.06 -0.22% -42.39 -0.93%
BGR -4.02 -0.12% -17.89 -0.52%
CYP -0.35 -0.10% -1.22 -0.34%
CZE -11.14 -0.22% -47.31 -0.93%
DEU -69.06 -0.16% -291.93 -0.68%
DNK -4.11 -0.15% -16.90 -0.61%
ESP -15.84 -0.09% -70.41 -0.39%
EST -0.69 -0.11% -2.71 -0.45%
FIN -2.39 -0.10% -9.08 -0.36%
FRA -34.50 -0.13% -141.32 -0.52%
GRC -1.42 -0.04% -5.57 -0.14%
HRV -1.27 -0.08% -4.97 -0.32%
HUN -7.28 -0.17% -30.75 -0.73%
IRL -11.32 -0.58% -50.33 -2.59%
ITA -31.23 -0.13% -139.14 -0.57%
LTU -1.64 -0.12% -7.43 -0.56%
LUX -0.45 -0.13% -1.63 -0.46%
LVA -0.13 -0.03% -0.44 -0.11%
MLT -0.55 -0.38% -1.75 -1.21%
NLD -18.60 -0.21% -73.20 -0.84%
POL -28.42 -0.18% -122.95 -0.78%
PRT -6.32 -0.14% -29.72 -0.66%
ROU -9.39 -0.11% -43.43 -0.50%
SVK -4.00 -0.18% -15.79 -0.71%
SVN -1.03 -0.11% -4.22 -0.45%
SWE -5.10 -0.11% -19.97 -0.45%
EU-27 -284.44 -0.15% -1209.47 -0.62%
GBR -139.86 -0.45% -526.83 -1.71%
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely
underestimate the true impact.
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Table 10: Most affected sector across countries: Brexit (“Hard” Brexit Scenario)
Country
Sector Nace Rev.2
Value Added (VA) Employment (EMP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AUT Machinery & Equipment C28 Metal products C25
BEL Food Product C10-C12 Food Product C10-C12
BGR Textiles C13-C15 Live Animals A01
CYP Financial Services K64 Administrative and support act. N
CZE Electronics and Computers C26 Metal products C25
DEU Motor vehicles C29 Machinery & Equipment C28
DNK Mining and quarrying B Food Product C10-C12
ESP Food Product C10-C12 Live Animals A01
EST Wood and Cork C16 Wood and Cork C16
FIN Paper Products C17 Administrative and support act. N
FRA Administrative and support act. N Administrative and support act. N
GBR Administrative and support act. N Administrative and support act. N
GRC Water transport H50 Live Animals A01
HRV Other services R S Metal products C25
HUN Electronics and Computers C26 Electronics and Computers C26
IRL Food Product C10-C12 Live Animals A01
ITA Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
LTU Petroleum Products C19 Textiles C13-C15
LUX Financial Services K64 Administrative and support act. N
LVA Wood and Cork C16 Administrative and support act. N
MLT Other services R S Other services R S
NLD Wholesale trade G46 Administrative and support act. N
POL Wholesale trade G46 Live Animals A01
PRT Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
ROU Textiles C13-C15 Textiles C13-C15
SVK Real Estate L68 Metal products C25
SVN Metal products C25 Metal products C25
SWE Petroleum Products C19 Machinery & Equipment C28
Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations and sector codes.
Note: The most affected sector can differ depending on whether we look in terms of value added or employment. The
reason is that the value added contribution per worker can differ dramatically across sectors, which means that the
same drop in value added might lead to different employment effects in different sectors.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely
underestimate the true impact.
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9. Appendix
9.1. Abbreviations
Table 11: Countries and ISO-3 Codes
Country Name Code (ISO-3) Country Name Code (ISO-3)
Austria AUT Hungary HUN
Belgium BEL Ireland IRL
Bulgaria BGR Italy ITA
Cyprus CYP Lithuania LTU
Czech Republic CZE Luxembourg LUX
Germany DEU Latvia LVA
Denmark DNK Malta MLT
Spain ESP Netherlands NLD
Estonia EST Poland POL
Finland FIN Portugal PRT
France FRA Romania ROU
United Kingdom GBR Slovakia SVK
Greece GRC Slovenia SVN
Croatia HRV Sweden SWE
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Table 12: Nace Rev. 2 Codes & Labels
Goods Services
Nace Rev.2 Sector Legend (Short) Nace Rev.2 Sector Legend (Short)
A01 Live Animals F Construction
A02 Forestry G45 Wholesale and retail trade
A03 Fishing G46 Wholesale trade
B Mining and quarrying G47 Retail trade
C10-C12 Food Product H49 Land & Pipeline transport
C13-C15 Textiles H50 Water transport
C16 Wood and Cork H51 Air transport
C17 Paper Products H52 Warehousing
C18 Printing and Media H53 Postal
C19 Petroleum Products I Accommodation & Food serv.
C20 Chemicals J58 Publishing Act.
C21 Pharmaceutical J59 J60 Media Production
C22 Rubber and Plastic J61 Telecom
C23 Other Non-metallic mineral J62 J63 Computer Programming, consultancy
C24 Basic Metals K64 Financial Services
C25 Metal products K65 Insurance
C26 Electronics and Computers K66 Auxiliary Financial Serv.
C27 Electrical Equipment L68 Real Estate
C28 Machinery & Equipment M69 M70 Legal and Accounting
C29 Motor vehicles M71 Architectural and engineering act.
C30 Transport equipment M72 Scientific Research
C31 C32 Furniture & other manufac. M73 Advertising and market research
C33 Installation of machinery M74 M75 Other professional activities
D35 Electricity & Gas N Administrative and support act.
E36 Water Collection Activities O84 Public admin and defence
E37-E39 Waste Collection Activities P85 Education
Q Health
R S Other services
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9.2. Derivations
Equation (17) can be found as follows. From Equation (16), we find dvakz as
dvakz = vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lkzis
N∑
j=1
df isj︸ ︷︷ ︸
final trade effect
+ vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
dLkzis
N∑
j=1
f isj︸ ︷︷ ︸
intermediate trade effect
(20)
Next, we apply the following rule to Equation (20): Differentiating L−1L = I yields L−1dL +
dL−1L = 0 from which it follows that dL = −LdL−1L. Given that L = [I − A]−1, we have that
dL−1 = −dA and hence dL = LdAL, from which it is straightforward to obtain the individual
elements dLkzis . Hence, we obtain
dvakz = vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(1− σs)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj f
is
j +
N∑
h=1
S∑
r=1
N∑
h′=1
S∑
r′=1
(1− σr)Lkzhrahrh′r′ τˆhrh′
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
Lh
′r′
is
N∑
j=1
f isj
= vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(1− σs)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj f
is
j +
N∑
h=1
S∑
r=1
N∑
h′=1
S∑
r′=1
(1− σr)Lkzhrahrh′r′yh
′r′ τˆhrh′
= vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(1− σs)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj f
is
j +
N∑
h=1
S∑
r=1
N∑
h′=1
S∑
r′=1
(1− σr)Lkzhrxhrh′r′ τˆhrh′
= vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(1− σs)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj f
is
j +
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
N∑
j=1
S∑
r=1
(1− σs)Lkzis xisjr τˆ isj
= −vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj
{
f isj +
S∑
r=1
xisjr
}
= −vkz
N∑
i=1
S∑
s=1
(σs − 1)Lkzis
N∑
j=1
τˆ isj e
is
j
where we defined τˆ isj ≡
dτ isj
τ isj
− dΠisΠis −
dP sj
P sj
as the proportionate change in τ isj net of the proportionate
changes in the multilateral resistance (MR) terms.
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